INTRODueTlON

AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Dramatic changes in world politics that accompanied the end of the Cold War, though was greatly welcomed, have not yet provided for the anticipated arrival of an unprecedented era of peace, stability and democracy. Initial euphoria and optimism is now replaced by extremely intractable problems and difficult policy choices that have emerged. While the international society proved to be iii prepared and too slow to successfully dea i with the multitude of threats and problems, the 'change' (be it political, economic, social, or systemic) has become a constant feature of international politics.
Amidst the historic systemic changes, Turkey, once a distant outpost of NATO on the European periphery, moved to the centre of the problematic post-Cold War world politics. She stood surrounded by 13 of the 16 threat generating regions, identified by NATO at the end of the Cold War. Yet, from a staunchly pro-western isolationist existence in its immediate neighbourhood, Turkey, at the end of the Cold War, suddenly moved into a posture, intended to have an effect across a vast region extending 'from eastern Europe to western China'.2 This change in Turkey's stance and mentality was not accidental, but due to wider changes experienced within and around Turkey during the 1980s. Without denying the importance of the momentum provided by the end of the Cold War, this paper aims to explore Turkey's transformation in domestic and foreign policies during the 1980s and early 1990s, in order to discern developments behind the powerful impetus in Turkey at the end of the Cold War to grab emerging opportunities. While doing this, Turkish experience would be juxtaposed against the wisdom from the theory of foreign policy analysis, in an effort to enhance attempts to sketch out a theoretical framework for Turkish foreign policy.
Constant transformation was one of the unchanging consistencies of Turkish socio-political life during the 1980s. Starting 2For earlier analyses of Turkey's newly-found self-reliance on foreign policy at the end of the Cold War see M. Aydin, 'Turkeyand Central ASİa; Challenges of Change', Central Asian Survey, IS, No. 2 (1996) , pp. 157-177; S. S. Gurel and Y. Kimura, Turkey in a Chaııgiııg World (Tokyo, 1993) ; and G. Fuller and 1. O. Lesser, Turkey's New Geopolitics; From the Balkans to Western China (London, 1993). with the military coup d'etat of September 12, 1980, Turkey had experienced fundamental changes in its political structure, economic system, social strata, cultural patterns, religious expressionism, and foreign policy. As a result, at the end of the decade Turkey was a largely transformed country and the thrust for change was stili visible. The transformation of various aspects of Turkish foreign policy may not be discernible all the time for outsiders and the changes may not always be as momentous as we witnessed at the end of the Cold War across Europe and the former Soviet Union, but it has nevertheless been there.
According to Zinnes change implies that 'something is happening through time' and that 'what was true at one point is different at a subsequent time point'.3 In this sense, 'change' has become one of the truisms of Turkish foreign policy since 1983, when civilian government once again took over power. A change in any policy is usually based on a change in ideas, on rethinking or reappraisal, and a variety of factors may have impact on specific foreign policy reappraisals or changes. 4 When and what factors determine whether and to what extend pressure for change in policy will in fact produce a change in hitherto rigid policy patterns is an important issue in foreign policy analysis. 5 In theory, a reappraisal of idea s may occur because of; --Changes in the composition of the policy-making system; that is shifts in domestic politics may place new people in positions of power and these new policy-makers may have 'normative, descriptive or theoretical ideas that differ from those of their predecessors', thus leadership change mayaıso imply a policy change. 6 In this context, throughout the 1980s, first prime minister and later president Turgut Ozal stood out with his 'differene ideas and 'vision' about various aspects of governmental policies, including foreign policy. 3D . A. Zinnes, 'Prerequisites for the Study of System Transformatian' in O.
R. Holsti_ -R. M. Siverson and A. L. George (eds.) , Change in the International System (BouIder, 1980) , p. 16.
4K. Goldman, Change and Stability in Foreign Policy; The Problems and
Possibilities (New York, London, 1988) , p. 1. 5Ibid., p. 3. 6Ibid., p. 12.
[VOL. XXXVI --Changes in the balance of power within the policy-making system; that is if the policy-making system contains advocates of competing policies, the balance of power between the camps may determine which policy will be pursued.? The struggle between the top decision-making bodies over Turkey' s policy during the Gulf War of 1990-1991 is a good example of this.
-Changes in environmental circumstances may bring about foreign policy reappraisals. International system and the relationship between the state and conditions existent within that system determines how the state would behave. 8 Moreover, 'nations under pressure adapt to changing conditions in their environment'.9 Thus, systemic changes may generate an important impetus for change by altering the conditions for foreign policy. LO In this context, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent transformation of world politics provided important momentum for national policy changes. System transformations mayaıso involve the extension of new, or abandonment of previous, commitments and therefore signify a change in the goals and/or objectives of partidpating actorso ıı Turkey's new commitments during the 1980s towards the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (later Organization -BSEC), transformation of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) to the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and relations with the European Community (later the European Union-EU) constitute ample examples.
?Ibid., p. 13.
8W. D. Copiin, Introduction to International Politics: A Theoretical
Overview (Chicago, 1971), p. 140. 9Goldman,op. cil., p. 4 Nations also take into account the way in which the international environment responds to their policies. Accordingly, the 'spill-back process' or the 'negative feedback' from the international environment mayaıso create pressures for change. 12 Hence, the questions of whether western pressure had an impact on Turkey's democratisation-human rights policies, and whether the negative feedback Turkey received from European countries and organizations after the 1980 coup d'etat forced it to look for new areas of linkage, are particularly interesting.
While the first two possible determinants of change are related to the internal domain, the latter is to the internationaL. Sinee the governments formuIate foreign policy in the context of domestic as well as international pressures, foreign policy studies should involve an understanding of both domestic and external environments and the interaction between the two. 13 Thus, the institutional structure, i.e., the type of political and economie regimes, by which goveJllments make and implement their foreign policies, is also important. 14 Finally, linkages between national and international systems continually reinforce eaeh other,15 and the impact of any aetion in international politics 'on a polity will vary according to partieular nations, struetures and groups to whieh the polity is linked and the nature of that link. Nations do not react to the international system as a whole, but to the way it is retlected in partieular actors with whom they have most contact'.16 In connection with this, Turkey's vocational linkages with the West in general and espeeially the effects of European criticism and Turkish responses are important. This paper, in the context of changes and linkages, will look at various factors that brought about changes in Turkish foreign policy right about the time the world, too, was experiencing historic changes. Needless to say, one of this study's principal contentions is that the type of political and economic regime in a state can be crucial in determining its foreign policy. Further, domestic environment and foreign policy of a country are intimately related and that each serves better to explain and shed light upon the other. Hence, it will show that the peculiarities of the Turkish governing system, its chosen economic strategy, and the 'Turkish style of democracy' have all had important effects on determining its foreign policy on the eve of the momentous changes in world politics and the end of the Cold War.
With these general observations in mind we may suggest a working proposition of the following factors as contributing to Turkish foreign policy formulation during the period under consideration (1980-i991): 1) the nature of the domestic political regime, including balance of power within, and composition of, the policy-mak ing system; 2) Socio-Economic dynamics; and 3) External environmenL
NATURE OF THE REGIME AND FOREIGN POLICY
In Theory
Domestic issues have important bearing on formulation and substance of foreign policy, though the extent and nature of this influence varies with nation' s political system. l7 There are differences between parliamentary democracies; guided democracies -of which Turkey was an example during the second half of ı980s; authoritarian governments -as the military regime of ı980-ı983 could be categorized; and totalitarian regimes. In democracies for example, the government has to contend with political parties, differing interests, traditions, ethics, religion, and a multitude of other pressures.
7
The political system of a country is also significant in terms of the decision-making process and responsibilities, as it determines powers, focus and the mechanisms of decisions in foreign policy.18 Democracies have their constitutional provisions for the organization of international affairs. Though there may be some manoeuvrability within constitutional framework, fundamentally whoever is in power must conform to it. These provisions sometimes render policy formulation and implementation cumbersome except in emergency when the nation closes ranks behind its leaders. 19 Nonetheless, parliamentary supervision remains active; and as the parliamentarians are rarely agree on vital issues, it may take too long to get an agreement on any given subject, tempting policy-makers to by-pass the parliament. 20 Dictatorships, on the other hand, permit decision-making without the supervision of parliamentary bodies. The fact that in a dictatorship a foreign policy decision is made secretly, without control s and restrained, contributes to the spced of decisions and swift action. In a democraey, on the other hand, foreign policy decisions are made as a part of public, parliamentary debate; their enforcement is slower and subject to moral restraints. 21 This brings us to the much-debated question of the role of public opinion in international affairs and foreign policy. The general assumption is that, in democracies, public opinion exerts considerable influence on policy-makers. It is argued, on the other hand, that public opinion offers abundant criticism but rarely, if ever, has constructive advice. 22 Moreover, irrational ideologies and charismatic leaders may sway the masses. Therefore, not institutions alone, but institutional behaviour is also relevant as the democratic and non-democratic way of life is mirrored in institutional behaviour, aUitudes towards institutions, and techniques of adjustments.
18F. Gros, Foreign Policy Analysis (New York, 1954), p. 118. 19London,op. cir., Without denying the importance of other factors, the actual choices of policies within states are determined to a considerable degree by the interpretation of the environment by the leaders and their conception of altematives. Decision-makers' understanding of the nature of their choices in tum depends on many factors, including their experience while rising to eminence, the structure in which they must operate, and the values of their society. In this context, the personality of leaders, who control the focus of power, may have important influences on foreign policy. This is especially important in authoritarian regimes, in which power of dictators is not restrained by democratic bodies, and where they exercise decisive influence over the conduct of foreign policy.2 3
In the modem world, the political \eadership in most societies acts in order to maintain the security of their national state: 24 so much so that foreign and security policies have merged to the point where statesmen and military strategists must collaborate c1osely.25 Therefore, it goes without saying that military leaders are needed for expert advice, and it is possible that their considered opinion can strongly influence policy decİsions. However, it is the responsibility of the decision-makers to determine 'how much influence the military may be permitted to exert on foreign policy decisions and whether military personnel should be permitted to state conflicting views in public'.26 Whether the influence of military leaders can be kept within bounds by a civilian govemment will always be crucial to a nation's position in international affairs and to its internal politics. Since Turkey was ruled by a military regime during 1980-1983, and the military was effectiye in policy choiccs even after 1983, the civilmilitary relationship and its effect on foreign policy-making are important aspects of this paper. there appear some similarities between military regimes' aUitudes to national security and foreign policy issues. 27 Two hypotheses are especially relevant for the Turkish case. First, observing that orientations and aUitudes of military personnel towards the political activity are c1early different from those of the civilian politicians, we can assume that armed forces personnel, whose main preoccupation is to defend the country, 'perceive national interest and the means to effectivcly serve it differently', and as such 'it is reasonable (...) to expect that one e they come to power (...) the country's foreign policy undcrgoes a change'.28 Secondly, observing that civilian influences on key policy-making units are replaccd by the military after coups, and that the military regimes usually restrict, if not totally prevent, 'the participation of hitherto influential groups in the decision-making process', it can be argued that this change in the decision-making process would affect the regime's structure, which is 'one of the important determinants of the country's foreign policy', thus it is 'reasonable to expect that the transformation of a civilian regime into a military one affects a country's foreign policy'29
In Practice
During the 1980s, Turkey passed through different regimes: The decade started with a period of multi-party democraey, entrapped by mounting terrorism and rampant economic disasters, which was abruptly interrupted by the September 12 coup d'hat. What followed were three years of direct military rule and a transitional period that finally gaye way once again to a multi-party parliament, if not full democraey. Thus, from the outset, it might see m that Turkish politics ended the decade where it had originally started. However, the Turkey of December 3, 1990, The difference between these actions is important because the September 12 coup and the developments following it were immensely important for Turkey's external relations, especially with European democracieso In general terms, the nature of the political regime of a country and its composition affects its foreign policy for mainly two reasons. 32 Firstly, the political regime has the power to define the broader framework of country's overall political philosophy, which, in the final analysis, constrains, if not conditions, its choices in international arena, since it detennines how the regime sees itself vis-a-vis other regimes and states. Secondly, the nature of political regime in a country also creates images outside the country and any change in the 'established' political regime of a country tends to attract reactions from other countries, which might result in pressures for change. 33 33Goldman, op. cit., p. 40 full military regime, though one can differentiate it from other military regimes in various points. 34 Its officially proclaimed aim was to guide the country into a full democracy as is understood in the wesı. Howcver, in practice, democratic identity was denied to Turkey, both under the military regime and during the subsequent transition period (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) ) by a combination of factors, ranging from continued restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms to explicit (implicit for the post-1983 period) usage of military's control and authority on various aspects of sociao-political life.
Not surprisingly, being less than a full democracy created tensions for Turkey during the 1980s, not only in domestic politics but in foreign policy, too. Since the military regime up until 1983, or the quasi-democracy thereafter, clearly contradicted with the fundamental values of Westem Europe, with which Turkey endeavoured to identify itself, it created tensions for Turkish foreign ministry where it seemed to matter mosı. As a result, Turkish foreign policy had to operate under straİn as the military regime in Turkey attempted to 'reconcile the divergent objectives of moving towards integration with Westem Europe while defending the rationale of being less than a full democratic regime '.35 In amore general sense, the frequency of military regimes in recent Turkish political history, together with a general tendency toward the suppression of certain ideas and freedoms, have become impediments for Turkey in its overall relations with the wesı. Such practices, especially the Turkish human rights record, have been instrumental İn creating a general lack of sympathy for Turkey in westem public opinion. 36 As a result, being govemed by a military the Europe grew apart, both because of the Turks disappointment with the Europeans who 'Iet them down in their hour of need' and the considerable coolness of European public opinion towards Turkey, created by what appeared as yet another demonstration of the inability to sustain a workable democracy that built up its 'othemess'.
lt was stated earlier that a critical international environment might create pressures on a country for reappraisal of its hitherto followed policies. In Turkish case, the external criticisms and hostile international, i.e. European, environment was instrumental after 1980 in forcing its decision-makers to look for alternative connections, which led to Turkey's openings towards the Middle East and former Eastem Block countries. This do not denies the role of domestic actors, internal factors, and systemic changes in reformulation of Turkish foreign policy, but the emphasis here, in contrast to the official Turkish view, is on the existence of a linkage pattern between international pressure, domestic politics, and the reappraisal of foreign policy.
In this context, the militarist nature of its government did not affect Turkey's relations with the east European or Middle Eastem countries, which did not raise objections about democraey, or indeed about torture allegations or human rights abuses in the country. In fact, Saudi Arabia was the first state to congratulate the Turkish military administration, and other s followed suit. 39 Unlike European organizations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) did not send human rights delegations to Turkey to tour prisons and talk to dissidents. For that matter, the change of the regimc did not affect Turkey' s relations with the US either, whose considerations for human rights and democracy were suppressed by its strategic interests in the Middle East after the developments of 1979 and 1980. Therefore, while Turkey's relations with Western Europe, which felt unable to understand the rationale behind the continued level of military intervention, were souring; its relations with the Middle Eastem countries, Eastem Block and the US, who gaye a supportive shoulder, were improved. Turkey's search for alternative courses of Policy, 1980 -1991 , unpublished PhD Thesis, Lancaster University, 1994 action was reflected by presidential visits during ı982 to Bulgaria, Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1985) , p. 38. different governments. This eventuaııy had a spiıı-over effect on foreign policy, as weıı as domestic policies, an area which hitherto governments had tended to leave to experts and foreign ministry bureaucrats.
39M. Aydin, Foreign PoLicy Formation and Interaction Between Domestic and International Environments; A Study of Change in Turkish Foreign
Equipped with strong powers and charismatic leadership, president Ozal, for example, was able to canalise Turkey's external relations towards realization of his 'vision'. Although Ozal's successors, Demirel and then Sezer, have used their powers with more restraint than their predecessor, the powers and the institutional structure for forceful presidential domination over Turkish politics, both domestic and external, are there for future aspirants. Therefore this aspect of Turkish politics should be kept in mind when considering Turkey's future foreign policy moves. These powers would enable presidents with a political background and strong convictions about the country's place in the world to impose their 'vision' on the foreign ministry, possibly against what the latter considered as the 'national interests' of the country. Since obtaining a consensus on what constitutes the 'national interest' of a country is a difficult, if not impossible, task, this aspect of Turkish politics, with its foreign policy overtures, could create tensions within the decisionmaking bodies of the country and among public opinion in general, as seen during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991. 42 In a country like Turkey where the military normaııy plays larger role in determining what is in the 'national interest' of the country than in liberal democracies, a clash between the opinions of the executiye and the General Staff always carries dangers of an other possible attempt to dislodge those who opposed the military's vision. Although it has been argued above that the Turkey of the 1990s and after is much different from earlier periods, and in this context another outright military intervention in Turkish politics is highly improbable, it can not be entirely disregarded that the possibility is stiıı there and one can conceive various possible future scenarios where the military might find it extremely difficult to resist 42For Turkey's policies during the Gulf War, see. M. Aydin. Ten Years After; Turkey's Gulf Policy (1990 -1991 Revisited, Ankara Paper 4 (London, 2002).
intervention. 43 Of course, which direction Turkish foreign policy might be forced to take if that was to occur, and what would be the external reactions to such an event, which would eventually have an important effect on Turkish foreign policy, could be difficult to predict. However, if the past is in any way indicative of the future, it could be argued that yet another military intervention in Turkey, even if it was to keep unitary, secular and pro-western Turkey intact within the western political system, could have devastating affects on Turkey's European relations and its Jeaders might, ironicalIy, end up severing Turkey's western connections (if she had not aıready been forced out) because of the impossibility of sustaining them in the face of mounting criticisms and extreme pressures from Europe.
it is also stated above that changes in balance of power within the policy-making body can affect a country's foreign policy. In connection with this, the dominance of the military within the political system during the 1980s affected both the foreign policy thinking and actions of Turkey. Later, the inclusion of hitherto obstructed Islamic forces into the realm of decision-making bodies smoothed, if not directly calIed for, Turkey's openings towards the Middle Eastern Islamic countries. FinalIy, the economy-driven administrations of Ozal after 1983, also led to the 'economy first' principle in foreign relations, and various political and ideological 43 A hypothetica! situation can be imagined where a break-up of the unitary Turkish state might seem imminent because of a Kurdish uprising in the south-eastern Turkey, or in an AIgerian-type situation where the secular outlook of the country is threatened because of a takeover of power by radical Islamic forees, that the military might consider it as its 'duty' again to 'save the nation'. For example, when Islamic Refah Partisi, in co alition with Dogru Yol Partisi, came to the power in June 1996, the politica! atmosphere in Turkey became unbearable within few months as the Kemalist civilian and military elites came to a loggerhead with the government over its ostensibly pro-Islamic polities, that brought country into a severe political crisis and to the brink of yet another coup. At the end, a 'post-modern coup' took place, and the top bras, acting within the National Security Council, and in cooperation with opinion makers in the country, forced the government to resign on February 28, 1997, with a carefulIy managed public campaign and the establishment of a new coalition between centre-right Anavatan Partisi and centre-left Demokratik Sol Parti.
differences in international arena were disregarded for expected economic benefıts. Of course, the most telling change in the balance of power within the policy-making system during the 1980s was the gradual concentration of powers in the hands of Iate president Turgut Ozal, which was strongly resisted and opposed by traditional foreign policyelite.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RISE OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES
In Theory
The socio-economic conditions of a country, closely connected with its political evolvement, form an important factor of foreign policy. The standard of living, the distribution of income, and the social structure related to the facts of production and consumption are elements of social strength or weakness, while political institutions, civil rights, are political stability are measure of political vigour, and both are closely interwoven.
The degree to which the economy of a state has developed may have important consequences for its foreign policy as different states at different levels of developments have different needs and therefore different links to their environments. 44 In addition, the level of economic development greatly conttibutes to the internal demands from governments to formuiate external policies that reflect and serve the diversity of interests that it produces. 45 Moreover, the level of economic development mayaıso be effective in determining a nation's capability to implement foreign policy plans. 46 'The more a country is develop, the larger is the proportion of its GOP that is likely to be devoted to external purposes, whether these be military The cultural and socio-psychological factors, which also belong to this group, are possibly the most difficult to analyze in precise terms. However evasive this factor is, it stili exists and perhaps even more enduring than those associated with economic development. No statesmen make decisions in foreign politics without evaiuating a pattern of political behaviour of anation which is either his partner or adversary.48 Foreign policy, whether for cooperation or conflict, sooner or later becomes a social process. Patterns of political behaviour, or of general cultural patterns are thus paramount, and statesmen usually base their decisions on their own and historical experiences. Moreover, values and memories may be shared widely within the country, thus producing a bounding effect between people, or they can be divisive forces among different part s of the society. Obviously, the societal unity may have important effects on the formulation of the country's foreign policyand the conduct of its external affairs. 49
Foreign policy formation, and its effectiveness once formulated c1early depends on many factors, but the extent of the support which officials would get from people is one of them. Furthermore, the importance of social and cultural unity as foreign policy input could be observed from the many nation-statcs which are affected by internal dissension among different groups. Though the implications of this fragmentation for the conduct of foreign policyare not easily discernible, its importance for Turkey, which was al most thorn apart by ideological strife during the ı970s and came to be affected by an ethnic separatism during the ı980s, is quite c1ear.
The characteristics and personality of decision-makers may have affects on their decisions, and therefore on a country's foreign policy. The office gives the decision-maker certain responsibility for making objective decisions when confronted with objective [VOL. XXXVI situations, but whether he actually makes those decisions may depend on his 'decisiveness'. Equally, the office gives him certain powers, but whether he enlarges the power of the office may depend on his 'assertiveness' .50 The objective situation would obviously influence the decisions of any man, but his personal views of national interest and his own personal interests and his personal style would also shape the decision. Therefore, it should be remembered that personality of decision-makers is an important determinant of nation' s foreign policy, and 'the higher in the hierarchy of the foreign policyorganization an individual's role is, the more likely are his personal characteristics to affect foreign policy decisions' .51
Apart from personal expedience, ideological indinations and societal pressures, man's values are formed, in part, by his rcligious beliefs. Therefore, it is also relevant to our assessment that the role of religion, in Turkish case Islam, in foreign policy-making should be considered, especially since Islam, unlike Christianity, does not prescribe the separation of religion from politics. 52 Indeed, devout Muslims argue that Islam is a complete social, political, legal and cultural system, and has its law: the Sharia. Consequently, Sharia is the only legitimate rule and there can be no separation between politics and religion. The importance of Islam's influence on foreign policy of Moslem countries, therefore, should to be considered. As an influence, 'it can act (.. 
In Practice
It was c1ear during the 1980s that Turkey's international affınities affected its economic policies. Especially, Turkey's move towards a liberal economy in early 1980's had much to do with its linkages with, and aspirations to be part of, the western political system. 55 Turkey's partnership in the western political system and its essential contribution to western security interests provided it with much more foreign aid and help during its economİc transition than any other country that tried to do the same thing. 56 Therefore there came into existence yet another linkage between Turkeyand its western vocation through its transition in 1980s to liberal economy.
Once Turkey made its switch, its new liberal economic system demanded a certain set of politieal aetions and international connections.
The eommon attribute of the programme that introdueed the liberal economy to Turkey on 24 J anuary 1980, and other austerity programs introdueed since than with the backing of IMF and the World Bank for the reeovery of the Turkish eeonomy, is that they all necessitated massiye net foreign eurrency inflows. The ways to generate the necessary amount included heavy borrowing from abroad, persuading foreigners to invest in Turkey, and increasing and diversifying Turkey's export potentials. However, the crucial point to all the economİc measures aimed at obtaining the above mentioned results was that theyall, in one way or an other, depended on the willingness of other countries to respond in a way that would favour . Turkey. Since it is c1ear that the success of the programme depend largeıyon the availability of foreign assistance, it can easily be imagined how Turkish foreign diplomacy had to exert itself to maintain contact with the various assisting governments and organizations Therefore, both during the 1980s, as the Turkish economy progressively integrated with the world economy, and during the 1990s, while it became part of global economics, the foreign policy became increasingly concerned with obtaining necessary foreign loans, opening up necessary market s for Turkish goods, and striking necessary deals with foreign governments and sometimes even with companies in order to bring more investments into the country. Thus, as the foreign policy of the country needed to be in tune with its economic programmes, economic necessities also became an important variable of Turkish foreign policy making. As a result, as Turkey's need for fresh markets was growing in the 1980s, so its political efforts to find openings in the Middle East and Eastern Block also inereased. However, at the same time, realization of the fact that the considerable sums needed by the Turkish economy could come only from western sources demanded a continuation of Turkey' s western linkages. Any severing in political relations would have dea it a blow to its economic transformation as welL.
On the social side, too, Turkey had experienced important changes during the 1980s. The repression of the liberal and left-wing intelligentsia by the military regime, and also their efforts to promote orthodox Islam as an antidote to extremism in society, led to perhaps not totally unexpected, but unforeseen, result of growing visibility of Islam in Turkish society, which was also effected by the world-w ide Islamic revival.
Although many high level and influential Motherland Party members were branded as 'Islamist', at least partial to Islam, by the secular Turkish intelligentsia, it is difficult to find particular instances during the 1980s where they used their influence to get (and obtained) policy changes in foreign relations. Giving allowance to the difficulty of separating the possible influence of Islam from other motivating values, and also of distinguishing between Islam' s motivating and/or justifying roles, a possible explanation for this subdued role of the 'Islamists' within the Motherland Party, could be that the 'Islamic faction' of the party was pre-occupied most of the time with a power struggle against the 'nationalisı' and 'liberal' factions, and, at the same time, the leader of the party, Turgut Özal, who controlled the party completely, had strong foreign policy ideas of his own and thus, thanks to his delicate balancing between various factions of the party, did not allow any one faetion to dictate his poliey-making. Moreover, most of the time, the presenee of everwatchful President Evren against 'Islamic' manifestations within Turkish politics, was also a restraining factar for Islamic intluences on foreign policy.
As a result, the Islamic revival within the country did not particularly affected Turkey's foreign policy-making during the 1980s -provided that there was a desire and pressure for change from the 'Islamists' since this is, save sporadic demands for closer relations with the Islamic countries, also difficult to pin down. Therefore, one of the actions that the Islamists were supposed to oppose strongly, that is Turkish application to the EC membership, went smoothly in 1987 without significant opposition.
However, since 1989, the effects of the Islamic affinities, in connection with the ethnic and historic sentiments, secmed on the rise. Yet again, it was stilI very diffieult to aseertain whether the Turkish public' s outcries regarding the Karabakh and Bosnian contlicts were the results of Islamİc connections, or rather originated from what was pereeived, by public at large, as attempts to wipe out Turkish ethnie brethren in the east and Ottoman legacy in the wesı. It is rather safe to argue that the role of Islam in Turkish foreign policy during the period under consideration was mostly confined to the justifieation of the policies for which the government opted for other reasons, and Turkey's reorientation towards the Middle East during the 1980s was the result of a combination of factors, among which the Islamic revival occupied a smail part -as indicated by the fact that Turkey turned towards the Western Europe and the Soviet Union (Iater on former Soviet Republies) when the political and economic incentives for closer cooperation with the Middle East declined after 1985.
This diseussion brings us to the question of the public's role in the making of Turkish foreign policy during the 1980s. All the channels of public expression were ruthlessly suppressed under the military regime (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) to the point that the public opinion's role in foreign policy-making was minimaL. It's affects, if there was any, during this period was only indirect in that the military regime was anxious to keep the public on its side. Thus the military leaders might have taken decisions, which, they thought, would go well with the public, although, due to nature of the regime, there was no apparent domestic pressure on the military govemment.
Even after the retum of the civilian govemment, the recovery of public opinion' s freedom for expression was slow as a result of various restrictions formulated by the new constitution and other related laws. Under the new laws, the activities of the various groupings, through which public opinion could be related to the govemment, were restricted to non-political areas, which by definition also excluded the foreign policy-making. Thus, during most of the period under consideration the govemments got an 'easy-ride' in foreign policy-making as far as the public pressure concemed. However, as Turkish public opinion became a progressively important factor in the policy-making process, paralleIing the inereasing democratisation of society especially after 1989, the Turkish govemments had to resist particularly strong pressures over its policies towards the Karabakh and Bosnian conflicts.
From the govemment's point of view, both of these conflicts represented no-win situations. As far as the Karabakh conflict concemed, Turkish public opinion sided heavily with Azerbaijan, and the govemment was under pressure not to sit on the sidelines so long as the fighting continued. Non-intervention by Turkeyonly stirred up public opinion and also gaye Iran an opportunity to steal the lead from Turkeyand play protector to Azerbaijan. Intervention, on the other hand, would have been extremely costly for Turkey in its future relations in the Caucasus, and with Russia and the US. Hence, in its official approach to the conflict in Nagomo-Karabakh, the govemment faced difficult policy choices between domestic pressures, stemming from the sympathy of the Turkish public for the Azeris, who they regarded as victims of Armenian aggression, and its desire to remain neutral and play a moderating role. Moreover, the complacency with which Armenian military advances had been received in the West did not help the severely embarrassed govemment, which was not only pro-Westem but did its best to remain on good terms with Armenia as well as Azerbaijan. Thus, this conflict fırmly undcrscored the dilemma that would face Turkey in its efforts to maintain strict neutrality regarding ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet republics.
Moving along from the Caucasus to the Balkans, another manifestation of growing nationalism in world politics after the end of the Cold War, that is struggle between Serb, Croat and Moslem forces over Bosnian territories, aroused great interest in Turkish public. Though Bosnia is several hundred miles from Turkey's borders and the Bosnian Moslems are not ethnic Turks, it seemed that Turkish public opinion had developed a feeling of kinship and responsibility for the Muslims left behind by the retreating Ottoman Empire from the Balkans after around fıve hundred years of domination. 5 ? Moreover, the existence of substantial numbers of 'Boshnaks', Turkish citizens of Bosnian origin, about four to five million, in Turkey further increased the identifıcation of Turkish people with the Bosnian Moslems.
What was important for Turkish foreign policy-making was that the importance of religious and historical links, alongside ethnic bonds, seemed to be on the rise in the country,58 and the Turkish government, as in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, was caught between domestic pressure and what was considered by decision-makers as sensible and responsible policy. Thus, while the Turkish government in its official response to these crises tried to be extremely restrained and followed policies aimed at creating coordinated responses with other states through international organizations, such as the UN, NATO, the OSCE and the ICO, in order to avoid charges that Turkey was pursuing pan-Ottomanist policies in its neighbourhood, Turkish public opinion, increasingly frustrated by the inactivity of the West, became very critical of what they perceived as the passivity of their governmenL 5?For an analysis of the Turkish policies in the Balkans at the time, see the G.
Winrow [VOL. XXXVI Moreover, there were wider and in the longer-term more important aspects of these conflicts for Turkish foreign policy. Most notably, a reassessment among the vast majority of Turkish people about the 'real face' of the 'western values' and the place of Turkey vis-a-vis the West took place. Especially in connection with the Bosnian contlict, while the Western inactivity towards Serbian aggression was increasingly interpreted as 'Western complacency' towards Serbian atrocities, questions were raised about whether the West would have allowed the Serbs to conduct their so-called 'ethnic c1eansing' if the victims were Slovenians or Croatians, that is Christians instead of Moslems. Thus speculations that Serbian attacks were in fact part of a new 'crusade' aimed at expelling the last remnants of the Ottomans from Europe were also aired. These events in the Balkans, when viewed together with the Karabakh issue, where as mentioned earlier Turkish public opinion again saw a Christian solidarity against Moslem Azerbaijanis, resulted in the questioning of both Turkey's Western orientation and the desirability of its further integration with Europe. In the meantime, pan-Turkist and neoOttomanist ideas made way among at least right-Ieaning intellectuals.59 Although these discussions did eventually die down without actually Icading Turkey to different paths, they, coupled with the frustration felt as a result of continual 'European rejection' of Turkey, put the successive coalition governments under the public pressure, and lead to a process of yet another reassessment of Turkish identity in the early 1990s.
EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT: SYSTEMIC CHANGES and TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
In Theory Unlike in domestic politics, where the political leadership exercise relative control in foreign policy political decisions are aimed at an environment over which political leaders (especially from smailer powers) have very little, if any, control. On the other hand, although, in practice, the conduct of states in the international arena 59For representative examples of such views see the specia\ issues of Turkiye Gunlugu, No. 19 (Summer 1992) and No. 20 (Autumn 1992).
seems to be constrained only 'by the decisions of the states themselves, not by an authority external to them' ,60 thus the basic feature of international society appears to be its 'anarchical nature',61 foreign policies are not made in vaeuum but in relation to other bodies similarly acting in the global arena, whieh creates certain sets of restraints, 'be it conventional, customary, ethical, legal or institutional'.62 As foreign policy consists of 'decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others' ,63 it ean be defıned as 'the actions of a state toward the external environment and the conditions under which the se actions formulated'.64 Therefore, while formulating foreign policies, policymakers have to take their international environment into aecount, since the success in achieving their goals may be affected by other states' responses and the level of their accurate reckoning of others' policies. Moreover, the stmeture of the international political system and the geo-political position of the state vis-a-vis the international system are also important determinants of a country's foreign policy and its success. 65
The more an assocıatıon is valued, the more it imposes constraints on its members, and the degree of influence members of an association ean exert over eaeh other depends upon the relative priorities they attach to maintenanee of the association and of membership in it. 66 This effeet eould be observed on Turkey's (VOL. XXXVI relation with the Council of Europe and the European Community during the period under eonsideration.
Obviously, a major part of the external environment of deeision-makers is formed by the aetions of the other governments in international arena. Sinee all the governments aet in order to further their own interests, a eompetition and/or eonfliet between states is the natural outeome. However, the nature of the relationship (dependent, inter-dependent, oppositional, ete.), will also be affeeted in the first plaee 'by the extent to which the two governments feel they need to the support of the other in question' .67 In this context, an important part of the effeets from the international environment is brought upon states by their linkage and influenee relationships with other states and state groupings. 68 The essential variables whieh affeet the exereise of influenee have been identified as: (1) 'the amount of influenee a state wields over others can be related to the eapabilities mobilized in support of speeifie foreign policy objeetives' ;69 (2) the 'extend to whieh there are needs between the two eountries';70 (3) 'the ephemeral quality of responsiveness';7\ (4) the maximum utility of the resourees available;72 and (5) the probability of reaetions. 73
However, this approaeh should be treated earefully when studying Turkey during the 1980s, sinee after experieneing US embargo following its 1974 Cyprus intervention and attempts by the US to use its influenee patterns extensively on Turkey to obtain a eertain set of outeomes which were not favoured by it, Turkey (New York, 1961), p. 386. became much more restive in its relations with other states and much more sensitive towards any influence attempt or intervention. Moreover, the apparent failure of US influence attempts during the second half of the 1970s made Turkey an unlikely target for new attempts during the 1980s, though there were European attempts to affect the outcome of Turkey's democratization process; theyare treated in this paper as a result of Turkey' s conscious linkages with Europe rather than influence relationship.
In Practice
The importance of the extcmal environment, especially regarding European reactions to the military coup and the subsequent evolution of Turkish democracy, are aıready elaborated above. Towards the end of the period under consideration, another impetus for change, originating in the extemal cnvironment, came to dominate Turkish foreign policy-making and forced Turkey to reconsider its place and standing in the world. This was the transformation of Eastem Europe and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, which had enormous impacts on both Turkish foreign and security policies.
it has been argued 'perhaps no other country outside the former Soviet block has seen its stratcgic position morc radically transformed by the end of the Cold War than Turkey'.74 Throughout the Cold War, as mentioned earlier, Turkey was a distant outpost on the European periphery, a barrier to Soviet ambitions in the Middle East, and a contributor to the security of Europe. Turkey' s geo-strategic 'value' was largely limited to its role within the Atlantic Alliance and, more narrowly, its place within NATO's southem flank. By the end of the Cold War, however, all these were altered by the appearance of new zones of conflict on three sides of Turkey. Further, the emergence of six independent Muslim states to the On the other hand, having based its whole post-war foreign and security policies on the strategic importance for the West of its location vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, Turkey, initially hardly welcomed the end of the Cold War. As the relevance of NATO in the 'new world order' was opened up to discussion, especially by the westem Europeans, Turkey suddenly found itself in a situation where it was threatened both by the lingering uncertainties regarding its immediate neighbourhood and by the fact that its westem security connection, the anchor of its European vocation, was fundamentally damaged by the end of the Cold War, which hitherto provided a relative safety and stability in the region. The realization that Turkey may face military threats virtually all around and it may not be possible to evoke the western security umbrella for protection shook the very foundations of Turkish security thinking and policy, and the need to reassess its post-Cold War situation vis-a-vis potential threats was alarmingIy expressed at the highest levels.
At the same time, Turkey has always attributed utmost importance to stability and continuity in its neighbourhood, and has been sensitiye against to changes in the existing equilibrium within its surrounding region to the extent that the preservation of the current balance is usually considered as part of the Turkish national interest. In this context, the disintegration of the Soviet Union affected both Turkey's foreign and security polices. In a similar pattem, Iran-Iraq and the Gulf wars in the Middle East, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosova crises in the Balkans, and the contlicts over Nagomo- Karabakh, Chechnya and Abkhazia in the Caucasus, all took place within the immediate vicinity of the country and presented Turkey with the dangers of involvement into such regional conflicts that did not represent immediate threats to its borders.
Turkey traditionally avoided involvement in regional politics and conflicts. However, international developments, as well as the evolution of Turkish domestic policies, compelled it during the ı990s to concem itself more with regional events, and to attempt for a prominence in international politics and a higher profile in the Middle East and Muslimffurkic areas of the former Soviet Union. It was thus drawn into the volatile politics within the Caucasus (especially Nagorno-Karabakh conflict), the Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosova), and the Middle East (Kuwait-Northern Iraq), where she was forced to take sides and follow an 'active' foreign policy. Dramatic changes in Turkey's traditional policy of isolationism from regional conflicts and its inereasing active participation in regional issues have, on the one hand, provided it with the potential to fulfil its economic and political expectations, while on the other hand, also brought about new challenges and security problems.
But almost a decade before all these challenges came abaut, the September ı2, ı980 coup d' etat had aıready have a deteriorating effect on Turkish-European relations. Although the military rcgime from the beginning dcclared its distinctly pro-western attitude, the incompatibility of military dictatorship with the liberal democratic tradition of the West, coupled with the slight willingness on the European side to show an understanding of Turkey's political problems, resulted in widespread European criticism and strained relations. Consequently, Turkey' s relations especially with the European representative institutions, such as the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, suffered considerably. Moreover, European organizations, and also governments as well, attempted to use their political and economic leverage on Turkey to obtain an early return to democracy and improvements in human rights conditions in Turkey. Although these attempts were partly successful because of Turkey's receptiveness towards such pressures as a result of its European vocation, they also created counter-reactions among the Turks as they resented being subjected to foreign pressure.
During the military regime (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) , Turkish-American relations, however, expanded as the latter, in contrast to the Europeans, showed an understanding towards Turkish problems mainly because of its strategic considerations. Thus, in the atmosphere of renewed Cold War, American rnilitary and economic aid to Turkey increased and a relatively unproblematic period of Turkish-American relations developed. Strategic considerations and further rapprochement in Turkish-American relations were also instrumental in Turkey's conciliatory attitude in the Aegean where Turkish interests C1ashed with those of Greece. As a result, the normal flight conditions were allowed to resume in the Aegean air space and, after a personal 'promise' from NATO Secretary-General General Bemard Rogers to General Evren, Turkey dropped its objections to Greece's reintegration into NATO structures. However, this initial conciliatory attitude by Turkey did not result in further normalization of Turkish-Greek relations as the Pan Hellenic Socialist Party of A. Papandreou came to power in Greece in 1981 with an anti-Turkish rhetoric and propaganda.
During the same period Turkey's political contacts with Moslem and Communist countries also increased as the former needed new outlets and political allies in the face of mounting criticism and inereasing alienation from Europe. The latter's largely uncritical attitude towards the military regime greatly facilitated these contacts. Moreover, adoption of a liberal economic strategy based on export-Ied growth demanded new markets and large foreign inflows. Given the fact that the political standstili in Turkish-European relations further hindered Turkey's efforts to rally any concerted European effort to help its economic recovery, Turkey had to tum increasingly to US-dominated international monetary organizations for necessary foreign aid, and to the Middle East and former Eastem Block for new export markets. Furthermore, the Iran-Iraq war, towards which Turkey took a neutral stand, was largely instrumental in new econornic surge towards the Middle East as both countries were forced by the war to rely increasingly on Turkey for their necessary supplies and connections with the West via Turkish territory.
Although the gradual return to Turkish parliamentary politics from 1983 onwards should have ideally provided a base for normalization of Turkish-European relations, the reality differed as European criticism continued to focus on the deficiencies of the Turkish political system and persisting practiccs of torture and other human rights abuses. Consequently Turkish-European political relations were slow to recover, despite the willingness and various attempts of consecutive Ozal governments. Towards the end of the decade, paralıcıing its democratisation process, Turkey had gained most of the lost ground in its relations with the European states and institutions.
Yet further progress beyond that point proved impossible, and the Turkish application for full EC membership was refused in 1989 not only in consideration of Turkey's economic deficiencies, but also its political shortcomings and alleged 'cultural differences'. This in tum created a new wave of resentment within Turkeyand brought about questions over the sustainability, and indeed the desirability, of existing patterns of rclations between Turkeyand Europe.
Turkish-European economic relations, on the other hand, recovered from their lowest point during the military regime, despite the inability of Turkey to obtain further concessions from the Community for its exports, especially for textile products, and release of the fourth financial protocol of the EC mainly because of Greek objections. In this recovery, the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the decreased purchasing power of Middle Eastem countries as the oil prices declined af ter 1985 played an important part since the decline in the Middle Eastem market forced Turkey to tum to its traditional European markets. Of course, gradual relaxation of political tension also played an important role.
Turkish-Greek relations continued to be strained during the period, despite various overtures from both sides for normalization of relations, and in March 1987 reached apoint of almost open military conf1ict over the Aegean Continental shelf. This resulted in consecutive meetings of prime ministers and foreign ministers of the two countries and relations moved to a strained but contained stalemate. The declaration of independence by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in December 1983 was particularly instrumental in earlier worsening of relations. Moreover, constant Greek attempts, after its membership to the EC, to make the Community a party to Turkish-Greek disputes and its continuing blocking of the normalization of Turkish-Community relations also created tensions between the two countries.
[VOL. XXXVI Turkish-Middle Eastern relations, on the other hand, continued to develop during the aza i governments despite the fact that part of the economic incentiye for closer relations disappeared gradually after 1985. In continuation of improved relations, important roles played by the growing ideological and cultural affinities of theruling political elite with these countries and by the insistence of azal to open up Turkish foreign policy towards new centres. Moreover, especially in Turkish-Iraqi relations, the perceived common security threat from Kurdish separatists was a source for closer relations. However, especially towards the end of the decade, and certainly after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, relations with Iraq, and also with Syria, were strained because of the dispute over sharing the waters of Euphrates and Tigris rivers. The issues became so explosive in the region that it was referred as a possible source of the next Middle Eastern war.
However, 'the next war' in the Middle East erupted between Iraq and the US-led coalition forces over KuwaiL Turkey' s policies during the crisis, both showed deviations from its established Middle Eastern foreign policy patterns and presented important c1ues about its post-cold war foreign policy stand. Turkey' s Gulf policy, which was marked by active involvement in contrast to earlier Turkish stand of not getting drawn into Middle Eastern affairs, was heavily determined by president azal, and as such reprcsented part of his 'vision' for Turkey's future role in regional and international politics. In the process, however, he precipitated a vigorous debate within Turkeyover his role as president and the extent of his authority.
Turkish-American relations continued to enjoy cooperation after the return of the civilian government, again heavily influenced by Turgut azal, who concluded that the US was undisputed leader of the world and that Turkey should closely associate itself with the US in international politics in order to attain its deserved place in the world, if not to prevent US influence from harming Turkish interests. Moreover, friendship between two presidents (azal and Bush) introduced a personal touch into the Turkish-American relations, and strategic cooperation reached its peak during the Gulf War when Turkey supported the American stand against Iraq. However, after the war, as the governments in both countries changed, relations between the two countries somewhat cooled down.
Turkish-Soviet (and later Russian) relations, also, continued to improve during the second half of 1980s and important cooperation especialIy in the economic realm came into existence. In this context, Turkey's innovative attempt to bring together those countries bordering directly the Black Sea or neighbouring the m in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization was also instrumental.
CONCLUSION
During the 1980s, change in Turkish foreign policy came about because changes in Turkey's domestic political, economic, and social structures, as well as its international environment. In this context, the affects of the European criticism and aloofness from Turkey were particularly important in foreing Turkey to search for ahernatives in its foreign relations. Thus, Turkey of 1980s followed a foreign policy, designed to balance its foreign policy between disappointments and rebukes from Europe and its new openings towards the Middle East, former Eastem European countries and the Soviet Union. At the end of the decade, Central Asian and Caucasian countries were added to these as the Soviet Union was rapidly dissolving.
The most important determinants of Turkish foreign policy during the military regime were the heightened strategic considerations as a resuh of the renewal of the Cold War; the necessities and demands generated by the revitalization of the national economy; and the nature of the political system in Turkey that largely conditioned Turkey's European connections. The military government simply try to preserve Turkey's traditional connections, while attempting, but failing, to shield its domcstic politics from external scrutiny. Conversely, Turkey became much more open to international influence and criticism in the same period, because of its chosen economic policyand avowed desire to become full member of the EC. Thus, Turkey's international politics and economic relations were internationalized during the early 1980s, effects of which came to dominate Turkey's external relations at the end of the Cold War.
Second part of the 1980s in Turkey was dominated internally by a gradual return to democratic governing, and internaBy by the attempts of the successive Ozal governments to claim back Turkey's [VOL. XXXVI place among European states. Problematic nature of Turkish-Greek and Turkish-European relations as well as changing character of the international system towards the end of the decade alsa he Ip to set the scene for Turkey's post-Cal d War posture. Besides, second part of i980s witnessed in Turkey discussions over Turkish identity, particularly ethnic and religious aspects, and their role in determining Turkish foreign policy as well as domestic politics. While the growing ethnic radicalism in south-eastern Turkey in this period and its international connections created inhibitions for Turkish foreign policy, growing awareness at the same period of Turkey's military power posture allawed it to exercise with the precursors of the idea of "Turkey as a regional power", which came to dominate Turkish foreign policy thinking in the early 1990s.
Finally, as set in the introduction of this paper, Turkey of 1980s was clearly dominated by a tendeney to "change", sametimes intentionally sametimes with outside pressures, the every aspect of the country from its economic and political structures to peoples' identities and beHeyes. Among all the intentian and actual preference for change in other aspects, country's decision makers nevertheless tried to preserve fundamental parameters of Turkey's foreign policy during the period under consideratian. At the end, it was the culmination of domestic and international pressures, as well as the rapidly changing nature of the world politics at the threshold of the post-Cal d War era that forced Turkey to move away from its traditional foreign policy posture during the i990s. However, the fundamental forces that brought about the se changes and reshuffling in the priorities of the Turkish foreign policyand were analysed in this paper, were clearly set during the 1980s.
